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Abstract: Pricing telecommunication networks has become a highly regarded topic during
the last decade, in order to cope with congestion by controlling demand, or to yield proper
incentives for a fair sharing of resources. On the other hand, another important factor has to
be brought in: there is a rise of competition between service providers in telecommunication
networks such as for instance the Internet, and the impact of this competition has to be
carefully analyzed. The present paper pertains to this recent stream of works. We con-
sider a slotted resource allocation game with several providers, each of them having a fixed
capacity during each time slot, and a fixed access price. Each provider serves its demand
up to its capacity, demand in excess being dropped. Total user demand is therefore split
among providers according to Wardrop’s principle, depending on price and loss probability.
Using the characterization of the resulting equilibrium, we prove, under mild conditions, the
existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the pricing game between providers. We
also show that, remarkably, this equilibrium actually corresponds to the socially optimal
situation obtained when both users and providers cooperate to maximize the sum of all
utilities, this even if providers have the opportunity to artificially reduce their capacity.
Key-words: Game Theory, Pricing, Wardrop Principle, Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg
game
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Analyse de la compétition sur les prix dans un jeu
d’allocation de ressource discrétisé
Résumé : La tarification des réseaux de télécommunication est devenue une thématique
très étudiée au cours de la dernière décennie, afin de faire face à la congestion en contrôlant la
demande, ou d’introduire des incitations pour une utilisation équitable des ressources. D’un
autre côté, un autre facteur important doit être considéré : il y a une compétition crois-
sante entre fournisseurs de services dans les réseaux tels que l’Internet, et l’impact de cette
compétition doit être analysé avec attention. Ce rapport appartient à cette vague récente
de travaux. Nous considérons un jeu d’allocation de ressource discrétisé avec plusieurs four-
nisseurs, chacun d’entre eux ayant une capacité de service fixe durant chaque intervalle de
temps, et un prix d’accès fixé. Chaque fournisseur sert sa demande tant que sa capacité
n’est pas atteinte, la demande en excès étant perdue. La demande totale des utilisateurs
se répartit entre fournisseurs suivant le principe de Wardrop, en fonction du prix et de la
probabilité de perte. En utilisant la caractérisation de l’équilibre résultant, nous prouvons,
sous certaines conditions, l’existence et l’unicité d’un équilibre de Nash dans le jeu sur les
prix entre fournisseurs. Nous montrons aussi que, de manière remarquable, cet équilibre
correspond en fait à la solution optimale socialement, obtenue quand les utilisateurs et les
fournisseurs coopèrent afin de maximiser la sommes de toutes les utilités, ceci même si les
fournisseurs ont la possibilité de réduire artificiellement leur capacité.
Mots clés : Théorie des jeux, Tarification, Principe de Wardrop, Equilibre de Nash, Jeu
de Stackelberg
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1 Introduction
The Internet, and more generally telecommunication networks, have progressively switched
from an academic or monopolistic network to a commercial one with competitive service
providers. In order to get a return on investment, each provider has to define a pricing
strategy to charge users for the service they experience. Pricing has at the beginning been
seen as a way to cope with congestion, to control demand, to deal with and satisfy heteroge-
neous applications with different quality of service (QoS). It has also been regarded as a way
to introduce fairness among users with respect to the traditional flat-rate pricing where light
consumers pay as much as big ones. Therefore, there have been many proposals for new
pricing schemes motivated by different objectives: the network planner may want to elicit
users to efficiently share the scarce network resources in order to maximize social welfare
(see, among others, [1, 2, 3, 4]), to guarantee fairness among users [5, 6], or to maximize
revenue [7, 8, 9, 10]; the typical modeling tool being that of noncooperative game theory
[11]. For surveys on pricing in telecommunication networks, the reader is advised to look at
[12, 13, 14].
A very large proportion of papers deal with the monopolistic case, where there is only
one provider. Though, telecommunication networks have become highly competitive and
it seems primordial to us to deal with that competition in pricing models when defining
the optimal prices, since competition may highly affect the results of price determination
(while pricing in a monopolistic context generally means a single level of game between users,
competition actually introduces an additional level of game, between providers, resulting in
a so-called Stackelberg game [11]). Some typical illustrations of competition are:
• for wired access, DSL users can choose among several competing providers to connect
to the Internet;
• the case of wireless access is more flexible. For example a user wishing to connect to
a WiFi hotspot may be located in a zone covered by several wireless access providers,
and can choose which provider to use for the time of his connection.
• The same user can/will even be able to choose between different and competitive trans-
mission platforms: WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, Wired operators, with a possible combination
of all those ones (the so-called multihoming).
Our goal in this paper is to introduce a pricing model dealing with competition. In our
model, time is discretized, divided into slots, and each provider has the capability to serve a
given number of packets per slot. We assume that providers do not share a common limited
amount of capacity/bandwidth, but instead each provider has his own service capacity: it
can model for instance competition between 3G, WiFi and WiMAX providers for instance.
Note that it does not correspond to competition at a WiFi hotspot if providers share the same
bandwidth, but rather to the case where providers are being operated on different frequency
channels and using different PHY modes. In our model, as soon as demand exceeds capacity
at a provider, the excess demand is lost (packets are selected randomly). We consider a
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pricing scheme inspired by the (monopolist) one introduced in [15], where users are charged
for the number of packets they submit regardless of their being treated or lost, in order to
incentivize them to limit their demand. We show existence and uniqueness of a Wardrop
equilibrium for demand at each provider for every combination of (fixed) prices, such that
each user chooses the provider with the least perceived cost, where perceived cost is expressed
in terms of charge and drop probability. Remark that this kind of modeling behavior is also
of interest in the case of multihoming, when users are able to split their traffic between
providers in order to keep the lowest overall cost. From this Wardrop equilibrium, we show,
under mild conditions, that there is a unique Nash equilibrium among competing providers
for the game consisting of setting prices, and we characterize that equilibrium. Those prices
represent a point where no provider can increase his benefits by changing unilaterally his
price. An important property is that the resulting prices correspond to the socially optimal
situation, where the sum of utilities of all agents in the system -including users and providers-
is maximized. This is a very desirable property, in favor of the application of such pricing
strategies, since usually noncooperation leads to a loss of efficiency, quantified by the so-
called price of anarchy. Another issue that we address is the interest for a provider to declare
or use only a part of his real capacity. Indeed, it may happen that, due to congestion, serving
less users, therefore at a higher market price, results in a larger revenue. We show here that
in this context of competition, it cannot occur if demand is sufficiently elastic.
1.1 Related work on competition
Studying the impact of provider competition on pricing schemes is a quite new topic which
is receiving increasing attention in the networking community. The importance of this field
has been highlighted in [16], where it was shown that the very promising Paris Metro Pricing
(PMP) scheme, which just consists in separating the network into disjoint networks served
in the same manner but with different access prices, does not allow service differentiation
under competition at equilibrium. In [17], a model where competitive providers play both
on price and on a QoS parameter is used, and demand at each provider is driven by an
arbitrary function depending on the parameters of all competitors. We feel that using a
unique total demand function that is split between providers thanks to Wardrop’s principle,
i.e. all users choosing the provider with cheapest perceived cost, is more relevant. [18] studies
competition for e-services, with also a kind of Wardrop equilibrium, but where QoS does
not depend on demand. In other specific contexts, competition between wireless operators
in the case of a shared spectrum (more flexible and leading to a more efficient management
of the spectrum) has been studied in [19, 20]. In [19], operators are charged by a central
entity for the amount of bandwidth they use, and therefore try to design proper service
offers for users. Competition is shown to increase users’ acceptance probability for offered
service. Our analysis is based on a less specific network modeling (and without competition
for capacity between providers). In [20], the authors discuss a similar competition problem,
but operators only play with the power of the pilot signals of their base stations, and no
pricing is considered. On the other hand, note that there is an increasing bunch of works
looking at independent and selfish providers on a path, that forward traffic of competitors
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to ensure end-to-end delivery [21, 22, 23], but do not consider a direct competition for users
between providers, a different perspective that we adopt.
The closest works to ours are that in [24, 25], where providers are represented by parallel
links and the quality of service is delay. The price of anarchy, measuring the loss of efficiency
due to competition with respect to cooperation, is determined, for fixed demand in [24] and
random demand but linear delay in [25]. This is extended to the case of parallel-serial links
in [26], for fixed demand. Those models consider that users are sensitive to the sum of the
price charged and a congestion-dependent delay, and providers are only sensitive to their
revenue. Our model is different since we assume that the total cost perceived by a user is the
price charged multiplied by a congestion factor, the externality being losses here (which can
be considered closer to some wireless environments). Moreover we consider that providers
experience managing costs that increase with demand, those costs not being perceived by
users.
Remark that the type of slotted and capacity-based model we are dealing with can
be related to the one in [15], where a similar slotted capacity model is used, but with
several priority traffic classes, and in the case of a monopoly instead of an oligopoly here.
We therefore have a different goal: study price war between providers instead of price
discrimination among users.
1.2 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our basic model and the re-
quired assumptions. Section 3 describes the socially optimal allocation when all providers
cooperate, this allocation being used later on to investigate the price of anarchy for non
collaborating providers. Section 4 investigates the demand repartition among providers for
fixed prices, following Wardrop’s principle. Section 5 is devoted to the Nash equilibrium for
the pricing game between providers; the quite long proof of the main result (existence ands
uniqueness) is deferred to the appendix. Finally, in Section 6, we consider the interest for
providers to artificially decrease their capacity, and provide our conclusions and directions
for future research in Section 7.
2 General model
Consider a model where time is discretized, divided into slots. Assume that there is a set
I := {1, . . . , I} of providers in competition at an access point (I ≥ 2), provider i (i ∈ I)
having the capacity of serving Ci packets (or units, seen as a continuous number) per slot
and asking a price pi per packet. If demand exceeds capacity at a given provider, demand in
excess is lost. We assume that lost packets are chosen uniformly over the set of submitted
ones. If di is the total demand at provider i, the number of served packets is actually
min(di, Ci), meaning that packets are actually served with probability min(Ci/di, 1).
Users are assumed to be charged for each submitted packet instead of each served one
in order to incentivize them to limit demand. The average perceived price per served traffic
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unit at provider i is therefore
p = pi/min(Ci/di, 1) = pi max(di/Ci, 1).
Indeed, the total income of provider i is dipi and the total service “rate” is di min(Ci/di, 1),
giving the unit perceived price just above by a direct ratio. In that situation, it can be seen
that the negative externality of congestion is expressed in terms of losses experienced by
users.
We assume that total user demand is a function D(·) of the perceived price p, and that
D is continuous and strictly decreasing with p on its support [0, pmax), with eventually
pmax = +∞. We moreover assume that D(0) >
∑
i∈I Ci, i.e. there is some congestion:
the total resource available is not sufficient to satisfy the maximum demand level. Remark
that the demand function can be interpreted in two ways (or as a combination of those two
effects):
• it can be a consequence of heterogeneity in user willingness-to-pay for the service: con-
sider a continuum of infinitesimally small users with fixed demand, whose willingness-
to-pay (in terms of unit price) is distributed according to a given distribution. Then
for a given unit price p ≥ 0, D(p) is the amount of flow generated by users with
valuation larger than p and is naturally decreasing.
• Likewise, the decreasingness of the total demand function D can also stem from the
decreasingness of individual functions.
We can also define the function v : q 7→ inf{p : D(p) ≤ q} (with the convention inf ∅ = 0).
Since D is continuous, strictly decreasing for p < pmax and null for p ≥ pmax for a given
pmax then we simply have
v(q) =



D−1(q) if q ∈ (0,D(0))
pmax if q = 0
0 if q ≥ D(0).
(1)
The quantity v(q) is then the unit price that one has to impose on users in order to ensure
that total demand will be q (for q ≤ D(0)). The function v is called marginal valuation
function: v(q) is indeed the maximum unit price that can be charged for the qth unit of
demand without making the demand decrease: it is a nonincreasing function since D is
nonincreasing.
We finally define V (q) as the sum of the marginal valuations of the q units of users with
largest willingness-to-pay, i.e.
V (q) :=
∫ q
x=0
v(x)dx.
As an example, if all users experience a fixed unit price p, then only the q = D(p) units with
valuation larger that p will subscribe to the service, and the sum of their marginal valuations
will be V (q). We refer to this function V as the valuation function: V (q) corresponds to the
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total price that the q units of demand with highest marginal valuation are willing to pay to
be served (remark that the function V is nondecreasing and concave). For a fixed unit price
p, the user surplus then equals V (D(p)) − pD(p).
A first step of our work will be to study how, for fixed prices pi (i ∈ I), total demand
is split among providers. This is described and characterized in Section 4 in terms of a
Wardrop equilibrium.
Knowing a priori the distribution d := (d1, . . . , dI) of demand that will result from a
price profile, the goal of each provider is, by playing on his unit price pi, to maximize his
net benefit
Ri(p1, . . . pI) := pidi − `i(di),
where pidi is the money earned directly from demand, and `i(di) represents the cost for
provider i of managing a demand level di. We assume that for all i, `i is nondecreasing,
differentiable and convex. Notice that contrary to the model considered in [24], this cost is
not reflected here in the quality of service experienced by users, but is only perceived by
providers.
The price chosen by a provider has an impact on demands, and therefore on benefits, of
other providers; therfore our model induces a game between providers. Since we consider
competitive providers, the framework is that of noncooperative game theory. We are going
to investigate in Section 5, under mild conditions, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium for the price game, that is a price vector p := (p1, . . . , pI) such that no provider
can increase his own benefit by unilaterally changing his access price, i.e., ∀i ∈ I, ∀p ≥ 0,
Ri(p1, . . . , pI) ≥ Ri(p1, . . . , pi−1, p, pi+1, . . . , pI).
Most of our results are valid under the following assumption.
Assumption A The marginal cost of every provider when his demand equals his capacity
is lower than the global marginal valuation of the sum of all provider capacities. In other
terms,
∀i ∈ I, `′i(Ci) ≤ v
(
∑
i
Ci
)
,
or equivalently
∀i ∈ I, D(`′i(Ci)) ≥
∑
i
Ci,
where `′i is the derivative function of `i.
We will sometimes need a slightly more restrictive assumption.
Assumption B For each provider i ∈ I, the following inequality holds:
`′i(Ci) ≤
(
1 −
Ci
∑
j 6=i Cj
)
v
(
∑
i
Ci
)
. (2)
PI n˚1855
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3 Socially optimal situation
In this section, we define social welfare as the sum of the utilities of all agents in the system
(i.e. users and providers), and study the maximal value of that criterion. It is well-known
in Game Theory [27] that agent selfishness does not lead in general to a socially efficient
situation. The loss of efficiency due to the divergence of user interests, often referred to as
the Price of Anarchy [28], is an interesting performance measure for a game: if social welfare
at an equilibrium of the game is close to its maximal value, then letting agents choose their
actions selfishly can be preferable to introducing costly control or incentives schemes.
Definition 1 For a demand configuration d := (d1, ..., dI), we call social welfare the quan-
tity
SW := V
(
∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di). (3)
Social welfare SW accounts for the utilities of users (the quantity
∑
i∈I min(di, Ci) is the
total effective user rate, and the first term of (3) is total user valuation) and of providers
(the second term accounts for the costs associated to the demand configuration). Remark
that no monetary exchanges appear in (3): this is due to the fact that such exchanges would
be added to the providers utility and subtracted from the users utility, which would not
affect the sum of all agent utilities.
We compute here the maximal value of social welfare, that will be used as a reference in
the next sections.
Proposition 1 Under assumption A, the maximum value of social welfare is reached when
di = Ci for each provider i.
Proof: The social welfare maximization problem is expressed by
max
d∈RI
+
V
(
∑
i∈I
min(di, Ci)
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di). (4)
Notice that since `i is strictly increasing for all i, the objective function is strictly de-
creasing in di for all i ∈ I when di ≥ Ci, therefore our optimization problem is equivalent
to
max
d∈RI
+
V
(
∑
i∈I
di
)
−
∑
i∈I
`i(di)
subject to di ≤ Ci ∀i ∈ I.
Since V is a concave function and the provider cost functions (`i)i∈I are convex, this last
problem is a classical convex problem (maximization of a concave function over a convex
set), that can be solved by the Lagrangian method. Denoting by λi ≥ 0 the Lagrange
Irisa
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multiplier relative to the constraint di ≤ Ci, the first order conditions imply that for a
demand configuration (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
I) maximizing social welfare, we have
∀i ∈ I, λi + `
′
i(d
∗
i ) = p
∗, (5)
with p∗ := v
(∑
i∈I d
∗
i
)
(i.e.
∑
i∈I d
∗
i = D(p
∗)). Then the complementary slackness condi-
tions yield
∀i ∈ I, min(λi, Ci − d
∗
i ) = 0. (6)
Let us define I0 := {i ∈ I : d
∗
i = Ci} and Iu := {i ∈ I : d
∗
i < Ci}, and assume that Iu 6= ∅.
Then for an i0 ∈ Iu, (6) implies that λi0 = 0, and we have
∑
i∈I
Ci >
∑
i∈Iu
d∗i +
∑
i∈I0
Ci =
∑
i∈I
d∗i = D(p
∗)
= D(`′i0(d
∗
i0
))
≥ D(`′i0(Ci0))
≥
∑
i∈I
Ci,
where the second line comes from (5), the third one from the convexity of `i0 and the non-
increasingness of D, and the last line stems from Assumption A. We reach a contradiction,
which means that Iu = ∅, and establishes the proposition.
4 Wardrop equilibrium for users
In this section, we investigate how demand is split among providers when the price pi per
unit of sent traffic is fixed by each provider i ∈ I. We assume that users are infinitely small
and therefore their choices do not individually affect the demand levels (and therefore the
perceived costs) of the different providers: such users are said to be price-takers since they
have no influence on prices. The outcome resulting from such user interactions is described
by Wardrop’s principle [29]: demand is distributed in such a way that all users choose one
of the cheapest providers. As a result, the user perceived price is the same for all providers
having a positive demand, and is lower than the unit price pi of providers i with no demand.
Since we considered the case of elastic demand, the total demand level must also correspond
to the common perceived price on all providers that receive some demand. The properties
that a user equilibrium must satisfy are summarized in the next definition.
Definition 2 For given capacity C := (C1, . . . , CI) and price p = (p1, . . . , pI) configu-
rations, a user equilibrium is a demand configuration d = (d1, . . . , dI) such that for all
i, j ∈ I,
di > 0 ⇒ pi max(1, di/Ci) ≤ pj max(1, dj/Cj), (7)
di > 0 ⇒ pi max(1, di/Ci) = v


∑
j
dj

 . (8)
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According to Condition (7), all providers with positive demand have the same perceived
unit price, otherwise part of the demand will have interest changing providers. Condition
(8) states that total demand corresponds to that common value of the perceived unit price
via the demand function D.
Remark that this definition corresponds to the one provided in [25], but for a different
pricing scheme and different cost functions. The following proposition characterizes the user
equilibria corresponding to fixed capacities and prices.
Proposition 2 For any capacity and price configuration, there exist a (possibly not unique)
user equilibrium demand configuration.
Moreover, at a user equilibrium d, the common perceived unit price p of providers i with
di > 0 is unique and equals
p = inf{p : D(p) ≤
∑
i∈I
fi(p)}, (9)
where fi(p) := 1{p≥pi}
Ci
pi
p. (10)
Proof: Since the perceived unit price functions for each provider are continuous and
nondecreasing, for any value of the total demand d there exist a demand configuration d
such that
∑
i di = d and condition (7) is satisfied. Moreover the common value pc(d) of
the perceived unit price at providers with strictly positive demand is unique when total
demand is fixed (this was established in [30]) when perceived unit prices are continuous
and nondecreasing functions of demand. It is easy to see that pc(d) is a continuous and
nondecreasing function of total demand d.
The second property, given by condition (8), that a user equilibrium must satisfy can
be expressed as pc(d) = v(d). Since v is a continuous nonincreasing function and pc is
continuous, nondecreasing and tends to infinity as d becomes large (pc(0) = mini pi and for
d sufficiently large pc is a strictly increasing linear function of d), then
• if v(0) ≥ mini pi then there exists a d such that pc(d) = v(d). The corresponding value
p := v(d) is unique due to the respective monotonicity properties of pc and v.
We now prove that p verifies (9). Since we assumed that v(0) = pmax ≥ mini pi, we
necessarily have d = D(p) from (1). Moreover (7) implies that di = fi(p), so D(p) =∑
i∈I fi(p). Relation (9) then comes from p ≤ pmax and the strict decreasingness of
D on (0, pmax).
• if v(0) < mini pi then there is no intersection point between pc and v, since no user is
interested in subscribing to the service at a unit price mini pi. Therefore the configu-
ration d = (0, . . . , 0) is the unique user equilibrium.
Irisa
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Figure 1: Wardrop equilibrium for tree providers and a given price configuration: the com-
mon perceived price at each provider with positive demand (i.e. providers 1, 2, 3) is p = p3.
Figure 1 displays the demand function D and the function
∑
i fi for a given price config-
uration, and illustrates the existence and uniqueness of the Wardrop equilibrium perceived
price p. Function fi basically represents the corresponding share of demand
1 that provider
i can get at a given perceived price p.
Remark 1 From this proposition, we are able to characterize the unique perceived price
p. Total demand is therefore D(p). For all providers with price pi 6= p, demand di is
then di = fi(p). All providers such that pi = p (if any) share the remaining demand
D(p)−
∑
i:pi<p
di, all possible sharing providing a Wardrop equilibrium. In this sense, there
is not always uniqueness for the Wardrop equilibrium and the corresponding revenues for
each provider are not necessarily unique. Note nonetheless that the resulting total revenue is
always the same. Moreover, we will see in the following that when providers are at a Nash
equilibrium of the pricing game, then the corresponding user Wardrop equilibrium is unique.
5 Price competition among providers
In this paper, we consider that providers setting their prices is the first stage of a two-
level game, where the second stage corresponds to users reacting according to the Wardrop
equilibrium described in Definition 2. We assume that providers are aware of their advantage
of playing first, i.e. they take into account users’ reaction when determining their price. This
common knowledge complicates the competition among providers, and is the purpose of the
analysis in this section.
1fi is indeed the generalized inverse of the function di :→ pi max(1, di/Ci), i.e. fi(p) = sup{di :
pi max(1, di/Ci) ≤ p}.
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Before analysing the pricing game between providers, we first prove a lemma that estab-
lishes some monotonicity results of Wardrop equilibria with respect to the price configuration
p. In the following, we often compare two situations from the point of view of one provider
to study the consequences of his price decisions. We therefore use the superscript “n” to
refer to the values (price, demand, benefit) corresponding to a new situation in contrast to
the reference situation.
Lemma 1 Consider a price configuration p = (p1, . . . , pI), and i ∈ I. If provider i raises
his price, i.e. chooses pni > pi while all other providers j 6= i keep their price to pj, then
• the common perceived price (for providers with positive demand) increases: pn ≥ p,
• if di > 0 then the demand of provider i strictly decreases: d
n
i < di.
Proof Since pni > pi then from (10) we have the functional inequality f
n
i ≤ fi. Therefore,
(9) implies that for all ε, 0 < ε ≤ p,
D(p − ε) > D(p) ≥
∑
j∈I
fj(p) ≥
∑
j∈I
fj(p − ε) ≥
∑
j∈I
fnj (p − ε),
which yields pn ≥ p.
Now assume that di > 0 and that d
n
i ≥ di. The equality p = pi max(di/Ci, 1) implies
that pn > p. Therefore the demand on all links j 6= i should strictly increase to reach
the same perceived price pn. This would mean that total demand increases, which is in
contradiction with pn > p and the nonincreasingness of total demand D.
We can now establish our main result.
Proposition 3 Assume that ∀i ∈ I, `i is strictly increasing and convex. Under Assumption
B, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium on price war among providers, given by
∀i ∈ I,
{
di = Ci
pi = p
∗ ,
where p∗ = v
(
∑
j∈I Cj
)
, that is
∑
i∈I
Ci = D(p
∗). (11)
The proof is quite technical and is left to the appendix.
The proposition basically states that the only equilibrium is such that demand matches
capacity for all providers, all of them setting the same unit price.
Remark 2 Proposition 3 establishes that the demand configuration at the user Wardrop
equilibrium corresponding to the competitive Nash equilibrium of the provider pricing game
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is exactly the demand pointed out in Proposition 1. In other terms, letting providers setting
selfishly their prices and users choosing selfishly their provider yields the same social welfare
as a perfect coordination mechanism would have given. This suggest that when congestion
and competition are sufficient (in order for Assumption B to hold), no regulation schemes
are needed since the market itself determines the right prices and allocations.
6 Game on declared capacities
In this section, we assume that a provider i ∈ I may voluntarily declare a false value Cni ≤ Ci
of his capacity Ci. Only the declared values C
n
i ≤ Ci are feasible: whereas provider i can
easily degrade artificially his service rate, he cannot increase it above his real capacity Ci,
and a false declaration aimed at increasing one’s demand to get a larger benefit would
consequently be detected.
From the point of view of a provider’s net benefit, there are two opposite effects of
lowering one’s capacity: on the one hand the unit selling price at equilibrium increases and
the managing cost decreases because the quantity sold decreases, whereas on the other hand
less quantity sold means less revenue. The effect that overcomes the other depends on the
elasticity of demand, i.e. the extent to which total demand is affected by variations of unit
price. Recall that when the demand function D is differentiable, the elasticity of demand
at a unit selling price p is defined by
pD′(p)
D(p)
.
Remark that for all p, the elasticity at p is a negative number due to the nonincreasingness
of D.
Since the demand is the inverse function of the marginal valuation v, a small demand
elasticity (in absolute value) means that v decreases quickly with the unit price. In such
a case, a small decrease of total demand corresponds to a large price increase, and the
positive effect on revenue of underdeclaring one’s capacity exceeds the negative one. The
next proposition gives a sufficient condition on demand elasticity for that situation not to
occur: if demand is sufficiently elastic (i.e. absolute value of elasticity larger than 1), then
providers have interest in truthfully declaring their capacity.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption B, if the absolute value of demand elasticity is larger
than 1 for p ≥ p∗, i.e.
∀p ≥ p∗,
−pD′(p)
D(p)
≥ 1, (12)
then no provider can increase its revenue by artificially lowering its capacity.
Proof Without loss of generality, it is sufficient to prove that the net benefit of provider
1 always decreases when he underdeclares its capacity. For any value Cn1 ≤ C1 of the
declared capacity of provider 1, Assumption B still holds with declared capacities, and the
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equilibrium of the price competition game is therefore given by Proposition 3. If we define
C−1 :=
∑
i6=1 Ci, the unit price p
∗n at the price competition equilibrium is then
p∗n = v(Cn1 + C−1), (13)
each provider i 6= 1 gets demand Ci, and provider 1 obtains demand C
n
1 and gets total
benefit Rn1 = C
n
1 p
∗n − `1(C
n
1 ). Notice that p
∗n ≥ p∗ due to the nonincreasingness of the
marginal valuation function v.
From (13), the total demand should therefore verify
Cn1 + C−1 = D(p
∗n) = D(p∗) +
∫ p∗n
p∗
D′(p)dp
≤ D(p∗) −
∫ p∗n
p∗
D(p)
p
dp
≤ D(p∗) − C−1
∫ p∗n
p∗
1
p
dp,
where the second line comes from (12), and the third one from the nonincreasingness of total
demand and (13) which imply that D(p) ≥ C−1 for all p ∈ [p
∗, p∗n].
We then obtain
Cn1 ≤ C1 − C−1 log(p
∗n/p∗) := d̄1. (14)
From the convexity of `1 and Assumption A (implied by Assumption B), we have
Rn1 ≤ p
∗nd̄1 − `1(d̄1).
By truthfully declaring C1, provider 1 would get a net benefit R1 = p
∗C1 − `1(C1). The
gain of underdeclaring one’s capacity can thus be upperbounded:
Rn1 − R1 ≤ p
∗nd̄1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1) − `1(d̄1)
≤ p∗nd̄1 − p
∗C1 + (1 − C1/C−1)p
∗(C1 − d̄1)
= C1(p
∗n − p∗) + log(p∗n/p∗) (p∗(C−1 − C1) − p
∗nC−1) .
where the second line stems from the convexity of `1 and Assumption B, and the third one
from (14).
Define x := p∗n/p∗ ≥ 1. We can thus write
Rn1 − R1 ≤ p
∗f(x), (15)
where f : x 7→ p∗C1(x − 1) + p
∗ log(x) ((C−1 − C1) − xC−1). It is then straightforward to
check that
• f is concave,
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• f(1) = 0,
• f is derivable and f ′(1) = 0.
Those three points imply that f(x) ≤ 0 for all x ≥ 1, which from (15) means that Rn1 ≤ R1
and gives the proposition.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a pricing game among service providers with fixed capacities,
such that each provider has an access price he can play with. We have characterized how
demand will be naturally split between those providers, following Wardrop’s principle, and
determined the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. We
have shown that this equilibrium corresponds to the socially optimal point (meaning that
the price of anarchy is 1), and discussed the interest for providers to voluntarily reduce their
capacity.
There are different ways to extend the results we have obtained. First of all, we could
investigate the case where providers share, at least partially, their capacities: does it lead
to a price war? Another interesting issue concerns the capacity expansion game. Indeed,
capacity could also be an important parameter providers can play with, at the same time as
prices: what would be the resulting equilibrium? Finally, it would be of interest to extend
the game to a multiclass system with different priority levels at each provider similarly to
what was done in [15] for the monopolistic game.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: The proof can be decomposed into two steps:
1. We first show that the point such that di = Ci and pi = p
∗ ∀i, with p∗ = v
(∑
i∈I Ci
)
defines a Nash equilibrium;
2. then we prove that no other point can be a Nash equilibrium.
Step 1: pi = p
∗,∀i is a Nash equilibrium.
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Note first that in order to have Ri ≥ 0, i.e., pidi − `i(di) ≥ 0 at the equilibrium point,
means that pCi − `i(Ci) ≥ 0, i.e. here
`i(Ci)
Ci
≤ v


∑
j∈I
Cj

 .
This last inequality indeed holds under Assumption A in the realistic case when `i(0) = 0,
due to the convexity of `i for all i.
We begin by establishing that the price configuration with pi = p
∗ for all i where p∗ is
given by (11) is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game. First notice that in this
situation, the common perceived price for users is p∗, and the demand of each provider is
di = Ci. We need to prove that in such a price configuration, no provider can improve its
revenue by unilaterally changing its suggested price. Without loss of generality, consider a
possible move of provider 1 from p∗ to pn1 6= p
∗. We distinguish two cases.
• If pn1 < p
∗ then applying Lemma 1 to a change from p∗ to pn1 we get that
– the new perceived price pn at the Wardrop equilibrium is lower than the original
perceived price: pn ≤ p∗, because of a smaller function f1 while the others remain
unchanged.
– the new allocation dn1 at provider 1 is strictly positive, therefore from Lemma 1
it is strictly above the original one: dn1 > C1, which implies that d
n
1 = C1p
n/pn1
from (8).
Consequently, the revenue gain of provider 1 for lowering its price is
Rn1 − R1 = p
n
1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1) − `1(d
n
1 )
= (pn − p∗)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
C1 + `1(C1) − `1(d
n
1 )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0.
• If pn1 > p
∗ then from Lemma 1 we have pn ≥ p∗ and dn1 < C1. First notice that if
pn1 ≥ inf{p : D(p) ≤ p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗} (i.e. the situation displayed in Figure 2), then
dni = 0 and provider 1 gets a null profit, that is lower than the profit yielded by playing
p∗ as noticed at the beginning of the proof. Therefore only the case when dn1 > 0 needs
to be proved. Actually since 0 < dn1 < C1 then we have p = p
n
1 > p
∗, which from (8)
implies that ∀i 6= 1, dni = Cip
n
1/p
∗, and
dn1 = D(p
n
1 ) − p
n
1
∑
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗
≤ D(p∗) − pn1
∑
j 6=1
Cj/p
∗, (16)
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Figure 2: Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 ≥ inf{p : D(p) ≤
p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
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Figure 3: Wardrop equilibrium if player 1 switches from p∗ to pn1 < inf{p : D(p) ≤
p
∑
j 6=1 Cj/p
∗}.
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where the first line second line comes from (11) and the nonincreasingness of the
demand function. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In that case, the revenue gain for
provider 1 is
Rn1 − R1 = p
n
1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `1(C1) − `1(d
n
1 )
≤ pn1d
n
1 − p
∗C1 + `
′
1(C1)(C1 − d
n
1 )
≤ dn1
(
pn1 − p
∗
(
1 −
C1
∑
j 6=1 Cj
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−p∗
C21
∑
j 6=1 Cj
≤ −
∑
j 6=1 Cj
p∗
(pn1 − p
∗)2
< 0,
where the second and third line respectively stem from the convexity of `1 and As-
sumption B, and the fourth line is obtained after upper-bounding dn1 by the expression
in (16) and performing some simplifications.
Step 2: uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Now knowing that there exists a Nash equilibrium under Assumption B, we establish that
this equilibrium is unique. Indeed, the proof of the uniqueness only needs Assumption A to
hold, as we see below.
To prove uniqueness, consider a Nash equilibrium of the pricing game, i.e. a price
configuration, and decompose the set of providers I into three disjoint subsets: I = Is ∪
I0 ∪ Iu, where
Is := {i ∈ I : di > Ci}, (17)
I0 := {i ∈ I : di = Ci}, (18)
Iu := {i ∈ I : di < Ci}. (19)
It is sufficient to show that Is and Iu are empty sets, since only the price configuration
p = (p, ..., p) can lead to the demand configuration with di = Ci for all i.
We first prove that Is = ∅. Assume it is not the case, and consider is ∈ Is. We study
the influence of provider is increasing its unit price pis to p
n
is
= pis + ε for ε > 0, all
other providers keeping their price unchanged. From the continuity of the perceived unit
price at Wardrop equilibrium in terms of the price configuration, there exists ε > 0 such
that pn > pnis , which implies that d
n
is
= Cisp
n/pnis from the relation between demand and
perceived price. For this ε, the net benefit of provider i is Rnis = p
nCis − `is(d
n
is
). His gain
in net benefit with respect to the initial situation is therefore
Rnis − Ris = Cis(p
n − p) +
(
`is(dis) − `is(d
n
is
)
)
> 0,
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where the strict positivity comes from Lemma 1 and the strict increasingness of `is . We have
established that any provider in the set Is can strictly increase his net benefit by increasing
his price, which implies that
at a Nash equilibrium, Is = ∅. (20)
Remark that Is = ∅ implies that di ≤ Ci for all i ∈ I, thus d = D(p) ≤
∑
i Ci and
consequently p ≥ v(
∑
i Ci).
Now we assume that Iu 6= ∅, and prove that at least a provider iu ∈ Iu can strictly
increase his net benefit by decreasing his price. We still consider a Nash equilibrium price
configuration, and denote by p the user perceived price for that price configuration. The
total demand should therefore be D(p). Since we previously proved that Is = ∅, then
D(p) <
∑
i Ci = D(p
∗), with p∗ = v (
∑
i Ci), therefore
p > p∗. (21)
When there are at least two providers, at a Nash equilibrium with Iu 6= ∅ then for all i
we have di ≤ min(Ci,D(p)), since Is = ∅ and total demand equals D(p). Moreover, there
necessarily exists a provider iu for which di < D(p): indeed there exists at least a provider
in Iu, and if this provider gets all the demand then it implies that all the other providers
have demand 0. Thus consider iu such that
diu < min(Ciu ,D(p)). (22)
We now prove that provider iu can strictly improve its benefit by changing its price from
piu ≥ p to p
ε
iu
:= p − ε for a sufficiently small ε > 0. We distinguish two cases.
• If Ciu ≤ D(p), then we easily see from (9) that the new perceived price p
ε verifies
pεiu = p − ε < p
ε ≤ p.
By changing his price to p−ε, provider iu is the only provider with the lowest declared
unit price, therefore from Definition 2 its demand dεiu equals Ciu
pε
p−ε , which tends to
Ciu when ε tends to 0.
• If Ciu > D(p) then for ε sufficiently small (such that D(p− ε) ≤ Ciu), provider iu gets
all the demand, i.e. dεiu = D(p − ε). When ε tends to 0, that demand tends to D(p)
because of the continuity of the demand function.
Consequently, for a sufficiently small ε, the demand for provider iu of switching from price
piu to price p−ε can be arbitrarily close to y := min(Ciu ,D(p)) > diu , and the corresponding
revenue gain can be arbitrarily close to
p(y − diu) − `iu(y) + `iu(diu) ≥ (p − `
′
iu
(y)) (y − diu)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ (p − `′iu(Ciu))(y − diu)
≥ (p − p∗)(y − diu)
> 0,
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where the first and second lines come from the convexity of `iu and y ≤ Ciu , the second
one from Assumption A, and the last line stems from (21). Consequently, provider iu can
strictly improve its net benefit by unilaterally changing its declared price, which contradicts
the Nash equilibrium condition and establishes that we necessarily have
at a Nash equilibrium, Iu = ∅. (23)
Relations (20) and (23) together with the demand relation
∑
i di = D(p) imply the unique-
ness of the Nash equilibrium: a Nash equilibrium is necessarily such that each provider i
declares unit price pi = p
∗.
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22 P. Maillé & B. Tuffin
[26] D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Price competition in communication networks,” in
Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2006.
[27] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1991.
[28] E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, “Worst-case equilibria,” in Proc of 16th Annual
Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 1999), vol. 1563 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1999, pp. 404–413.
[29] J. Wardrop, “Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research,” proceedings of the In-
stitute of Civil Engineers, vol. 1, pp. 325–378, 1957.
[30] M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. B. Winsten, Studies in the economics of trans-
portation. Yale University Press, New Heaven, Connecticut, 1956.
Irisa
